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MARKET FOR EXCUSES THEORIES
Abstract: The history of accounting for private railway companies in 
Germany shows that these companies played a major role in the dif-
fusion of historical cost accounting principles and gave birth, togeth-
er with big other joint stock companies, to the “dynamic” or second 
stage of capitalist accounting, at least in continental Europe.
If the representatives of such railway companies did not develop new 
concepts of accounting, notably as concerned depreciation, they had, 
by 1875-1879, elaborated a new theory of accounting (historical cost 
or dynamic theory).This theory had a profound impact at least on the 
German theorists of the late 19th century and early 20th centuries 
such as Simon, Rieger and Schmalenbach.
This new theory was needed to justify a new law favoring sharehold-
ers in a hurry for returns on their investments rather than company 
creditors. It also defeated the ideology of public finance and patri-
monial (or static) theories of accounting. This new theory preceded 
the law which promulgated the new approach and clearly defended 
the private interests of shareholders as opposed to those of the public 
in the strict sense. It appears to contradict Watts and Zimmermann’s 
basic hypothesis of the «theory of market excuses». Agency theory 
seemingly does not to apply either, for the new theory was proposed 
by managers allied to shareholders, specifically those «hurried share-
_________
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holders”, against creditors. This is why a kind of «theory of alliance» 
appears to be more consistent with these developments. The main 
reasons for developing the new accounting theory were linked to the 
issue of dividends. It was necessary to find an accounting approach 
which would allow the distribution of dividends at the very beginning 
of an investment cycle. It was also intended to find an accounting ap-
proach which would ensure that profits were distributed as evenly as 
possible throughout the entire investment cycle and among the differ-
ent shareholders who had financed the investment.
Hence, the second stage of the capitalist accounting development 
was not connected to measure of performance or information prob-
lems (monitoring and bonding) but seems to have been caused by 
the need to regulate profits and dividends in the interests of manag-
ers and shareholders. However, as this change took place within the 
framework of prudence, it was impossible, at that stage of capitalist 
accounting, to achieve a perfect smoothing of the rate of accounting 
profit. The solution to this problem was only to be found at the end of 
the 20th century with the onset of the third or actuarial stage and the 
“discovery” of fair value.
INTRODUCTION
Accounting for railway companies is considered to have 
played a major role in the evolution of accounting thought and 
practice. This role increased, at least from a theoretical point of 
view, as leaders of the positivist school referring to Anglo-Saxon 
accounting literature concerning railways, demonstrate that ac-
counting theories are normative and used as excuses for politi-
cal action [Watts and Zimmerman, 1979, pp. 273 and 290].
In America and England the history of railway accounting 
is relatively well known thanks to a wide  range of references 
written over the last seventy five years [Mason ,1933],[Littleton
,1933],[May,1936],[Pollins,1956],[Brief,1966,1967],[Kitchen,197
4],[Boockholdt,1978],[Glynn, 1984],[Edwards,1985,1986,1989] 
and [Bryer,1991]. By contrast, recent literature on the history of 
accounting for German railway companies is sparse and does 
not deal with the subject specifically [Oberbrinckmann, 1990], 
[Schneider, 1987]. There is also some older rather technical 
literature which is rarely referred to because it is written in Ger-
man [Reden, 1843], [Passow, 1919], [Barth, 1953] and [Mieles, 
1932]. However, this history deserves to be brought to light and 
made accessible to a larger public in the context of the modern 
debate about the political and social roles of accounting. It is 
our intention to fulfil this double task of exhumation and rein-
terpretation of the history of German railway accounting. Here 
we focus on the history of private Prussian railway companies 
which have played such a major role in the development of 
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the German railway system. Our period of study starts in 1838 
which coincides with the passing of the first law on accounting 
for railways and ends in 1884 with the passing of the joint stock 
law. The latter law was very important, marking a key turning 
point in the history of German accounting, under the influ-
ence of railway managers and their shareholders. Our objective 
is mainly to respond to traditional questions that have been 
raised in Anglo- American literature. A first group of questions 
concerns the role played by railway accounting in the diffusion 
of new accounting techniques and the reasons why a specific 
system of accounting has appeared. A second group of questions 
focuses on theoretical problems: did the development of the 
Prussian approach to railway accounting influence the devel-
opments on any specific accounting theory? If this is the case, 
does the thesis developed by Watts and Zimmerman according 
to which “accounting theory satisfies the demand for excuses” 
apply in the German or Prussian case? In a more general sense 
does agency theory suit the role played by social actors (manag-
ers, creditors and shareholders) in the development of a new 
accounting philosophy?
Presently, Germany, from an accounting point of view, 
is characterised as a “code law” country [Nobes, 1992]. This 
feature is not new and applies to Prussian railway accounting 
which was strictly regulated with an impressive number of spe-
cific or general laws passed in 1838, 1839, 1843, 1861, 1870 and 
1884. Each law was the ground for lawyers who defended differ-
ent positions concerning accounting. The study of this invalu-
able material will constitute the object of the first part of this ar-
ticle following a brief presentation of the historical background. 
The second part will be devoted to answering the questions we 
have previously listed.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In Prussia, at the end of the 1820s and the beginning of the 
1830s, the very first railway lines were constructed and managed 
by private companies1. This situation lasted up to the end of the 
1840s when the State began either to buy (and manage) some 
companies, such as the Ostbahn and the Saarbrückereisenbahn, 
or to take over the management of some private companies, 
1  Among the very first ones are lines  joining different mines such as the 
Hardsteiner Review Eberfeld line opened in 1829, and the Deilbach Teilstrecke 
opened in 1831 [Steitz 1974, pp. 105-109] all founded by an association of private 
undertakers.
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such as the Aachen-Düsseldorfer and the Bergisch-Märkischen 
railway companies [Mieles, 1932, p. 37]. However, by 1862, the 
role of the State was not yet dominant as illustrated by the fol-
lowing summary [Steitz 1974, p. 90 quoting Kech’s Eisenbahn-
politik]:
fully owned and managed by the State: 1562 km
privately owned but managed by the State:  1355 km
fully owned and managed by private companies: 3050 
km
It was only during the nineties that the State, in the context 
of an economic crisis, took the lead through substantial pur-
chases of private railway companies. This progressive growth of 
government control culminated in the complete nationalisation 
of the last remaining private railway companies. In this study, 
which ends with the joint stock law of 1884, we are only dealing 
with privately owned railway companies.
Through-out this period, and especially during the thirties 
and the forties, the main problem with German private rail 
companies was one of financing. The private companies had 
hoped that the government would finance their operations with 
state-bonds2 but until 1842 this was difficult because of the law 
of “January17, 1820” (Staats-schuldenedikt) which forced the 
Prussian authorities to ask for special authorisation from the 
Parliament [Steitz, 1974, p.170]. So, realistically, up to the for-
ties, private rail companies had depended on private capital. 
The challenge was not so much a lack of capital as a problem 
of profits. As Hansemann, a proprietor of textile and insurance 
companies of Aachen, and one of the founders of the Köln-
Mindener (Cologne-Minder) railway company put it, the crucial 
point was not the capital but the “hope for profits” [Hansemann, 
1837, p. 30]. For most potential capitalists, at least, the expecta-
tion of profits was for rapid profits if not an immediate return 
on their investment [Steitz, 1974, pp. 31 and 52].
This demand for immediate and “guaranteed” profits not 
only clashed with the risk taking approach of “true capitalists” 
but was also in total conflict with the nature of investments in 
2  If they succeeded in doing that, it could be the occasion for some founders 
to get very high profits, along with the leverage effect [Eichholtz, 1962, pp. 154].
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rail companies which require long periods of construction and 
also some difficulties at first to have an effective management. 
As the German history of railways shows, as soon as the hope 
for rapid profits vanished, many capitalists refused to go on 
financing the capital already subscribed3 and sometimes pre-
ferred to demand the dissolution of the company. Among the 
main well known illustrations of this kind of situation, is the 
case of the Leipzig-Dresdener Eisenbahn, whose Magdeburg’s 
shareholders led a campaign in the newspapers in 1839 to de-
mand a general assembly to decide on the dissolution of the 
company. And especially the Rhein-Weserbahngesellschaft case, 
which, in 1844, was driven to dissolution by its frightened share-
holders [Steitz, pp. 185 and 196].
The German capitalist founders of the first big railway 
companies such as Camphausen, the President of the Handels-
cammer (Chamber of Commerce) of Cologne, and Hansemann 
(already quoted) were perfectly aware that they could hardly 
have succeeded in their projects without the help of the State 
and the administration of big towns such as Cologne and 
Münster. They proposed, with different modes, an alliance of 
the private capital with the Junker-state administration. Cam-
phausen, who had led the defunct project of the Rhein-weser 
company, thought that the private companies could build the 
tracks but with the help and control (Regalwalt) of the State and 
that the latter, after a certain time, could take on the administra-
tion [Steitz, 1974, pp. 54-55]. Hansemann, the founder of the 
Cologne-Minden Company, was inclined to think that the private 
capital could build only the most profitable lines (with the help 
of State-loans) and leave the burden of the construction of the 
other lines to the State [Steitz, 1874, p.56].
However different their philosophies were, these captains of 
industry agreed on the distribution of fixed interest (Zinsen) at a 
minimum rate of 3, 5% to shareholders not only after the begin-
ning of the operation but also during the period of construction 
(Bauzinsen). They also admitted the State guarantee in that 
these interests could be paid independently from the results of 
the company (in exchange for various modalities which could 
give the State the possibility of becoming a long term propri-
etor). These modalities were also sustained by economists, 
notably List, who published a leading article in favour of the as-
sociation of the State and the private capital after his come-back 
from the United States in 1832 [Steitz, 1974, p. 51, quoting Mey-
3  It was usual during the thirties and the forties to pay only 10% of the shares.
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er, 1918]. As Steitz showed, the negotiations with the State were 
very hard, notably concerning financing through public loans. 
It is interesting to give an example of their results in the case 
of the Cologne-Minden Company, one of the biggest projects in 
the forties. After lengthy bargaining with the State it was agreed 
in 1843 that the company was to be founded with share capital 
(Fonds im Aktien Kapital) of 13 000 000 Taler and a participa-
tion of the Prussian State amounting to 1/7 of Share capital (it 
means 1 860 000 Taler). The rest of the share capital had to be 
found on the free capital market (under the condition of an ini-
tial payment of 10%). Independently from their source all shares 
would receive an annual interest of 4% during the period of 
construction (Bauzinsen). If there was a need for a supplement 
of fixed assets this excess would either be financed by additional 
share capital (with a participation of the state by 1/4) or by loan 
with the authorization of the board of administration and the 
ministry of finance. 
Beyond financing, the statute of the Cologne-Minden Com-
pany also provided for some definition of income: after the 
opening of the operations the net income (Ertrag) would be cal-
culated by deducting the interests for bonds, the management, 
administration and reparation (Unterhaltung) costs (Kosten) 
and a sum for supplying a special Reserve fund4. This net in-
come would be distributed first as a 3, 5% guaranteed interest 
for shares and the rest as dividends. If it exceeded 5% of the 
capital, the surplus would be shared on the basis of 1/3 for the 
State and 2/3 for private shareholders. Some special provisions 
were introduced concerning the role of the State. The surplus 
paid to the State could be used by the latter to pay guaranteed 
interests (in case of difficulties of the enterprise) or to amortize 
(at nominal value) 6/7 of the capital subscribed by privates own-
ers5.Moreover it was mandatory for the State to proceed to this 
amortization if the return on the share capital was below 3,5% 
when the guarantee of the State was required : in that case the 
State could use the interests received on its share of capital and 
the interests corresponding to the construction.
Beyond this financial data, it is interesting to mention that 
certain clauses of the statutes relative to the administration of 
4  This deduction could not surpass the level of 3% of share capital without the 
permission of the State.
5  According to the calculation made by Hansemann, these reimbursements could take 
57 years before the State could be the sole owner of the company [Steitz 1974, p. 
266].
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the company provided for some prerogatives of the State [Ste-
itz, 1974, p. 266]. The decisions about tariffs, the nomination 
of the head of the board of administration, the main technical 
directors and the chief accountant (Hauptkassierer) required the 
authorization of the Ministry of finance. The State had the right 
to nominate a member of the Directors, who was not obliga-
torily a shareholder but who retained the right to vote. A royal 
superintendent (Kommissar) took part in the general assembly 
with a minimum of 1/7 of the voting power (at the start, with a 
progressive rise of this proportion to 1/4 and even 1/3 after 35 
years). These clauses were written in 1843 after the publication 
of the law of 1838 governing the railway companies but all the 
ideas expressed in the Cologne-Minden statute and the law of 
1838 (see below) had already been expressed as early as 1832 by 
List and also by Camphausen during the long negotiation that 
led to the failure of the Rhein-Weser project from 1837 to 1838 
[Steitz, 1974, pp.  182-201].
The main lesson to be taken from these texts for our pur-
pose is that there was an interaction of different types of influ-
ences at the head of the private railway companies: an influence 
of capitalist owner-managers submitted to the pressure of small 
and “hurried” shareholders and an influence of representatives 
of the State or of regional administrations. This diversity of in-
fluence, of course, was a critical point for the development of ac-
counting as it has already been stressed at the heroic time of the 
first railways by Von Reden, the director of the Berlin-Station 
railway [1843, p. 300], and also later by Mieles, whose declara-
tions are worthwhile quoting: 
“usually, the accounting system of German railway 
companies has been influenced both by the merchant 
and the public finance way of thinking. At the begin-
ning of the railway period in Germany merchants and 
public treasury people gathered together. The Treasury 
accountant6 (Kameralist) had to recognize the mer-
chant objectives ... and become used to the essence of 
merchant vision, the desire of profit. On the contrary 
the merchant had to adapt to the representation of the 
public finance accountants: this explains why a special 
form of accounting arose” [Mieles, 1932, p. 29].
6  Steitz interestingly notes that in the thirties, on the level of the Prussian 
administration, high officers such as Nagler (director of the Post Office) and 
Rother (who led the negociation with capitalists such as Camphausen ) only knew 
the public finance (Kameral) accounting [1874, p. 79].
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We are now going to analyse what was, for early Prussian 
railways, this “special form of accounting” and which rules 
applied to it.
THE EARLY REGULATION OF 1838-1839 AND THE
BIRTH OF THE PRUSSIAN RAILWAY ACCOUNTING
The first clear and general representation of the initial Prus-
sian accounting system for railways companies was given by a 
law published in 1838 and a commentary made in 1839 by the 
Prussian administration. The Law of railways (Eisenbahngesetz) 
of “November 3, 1838” was promulgated at a time when there 
was no strict regulation in Prussia concerning the joint stock 
companies. The main articles concerning accounting were ar-
ticles 29, 33, 34 and 38 which we will reproduce hereafter. 
Article 29 : “The company has to determine its receipts 
(Bahngeld) in order to cover “the costs (Kosten) of 
maintaining and managing of the railway”...;take ac-
count “of a statutory contribution for collecting a re-
serve fund (Reserve funds) for extraordinary outlays 
(Ausgaben) concerning the way and the accessories”; 
“cover other expenses (Lasten) such as the taxes pro-
vided at the Article 38”...; “benefit from a net surplus 
(Reinertrag) including both interest and profit (Ge-
winn) corresponding to an amount not exceeding 10% 
of the capital invested (Anlagekapital) and no less than 
6% of this capital”;
Article 33: “If after deduction of all expenditure (Aus-
gaben), including the annual amount provided for sup-
plying the reserve fund, the net surplus exceeds 10% 
of the invested capital the administration is entitled to 
demand a reduction of the transportation prices”.
Article 34: “For the sake of the execution of the articles 
29-33 the company has to take into account precise ac-
counting (Rechnung) on every part of its undertaking 
(Unternehmung) and to follow for that purpose, the 
indications given by the Ministry of Commerce. The re-
sults of this accounting are to be transmitted every year 
to the administration”.
Article 38: “The railway company must pay a tax (Ab-
gabe) which is based on its surplus after deduction of 
all management and maintaining costs as well as the 
amount of the contribution to the reserve fund”. 
8
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Some conclusions can be drawn from these articles. The 
main one is that contrary to the uses and the laws concern-
ing the merchants, there was no formal obligation to make a 
patrimonial balance sheet that could include the assets and the 
liabilities. This point has already been stressed by the German 
literature of the late 19th [Schüler, 1879, p. 65] and the early 
20th centuries [Passow, 1919, p. 241]. The law asked the compa-
nies to draw up a cash flow account describing the cash receipts 
(Bahngeld) and the cash payments (Ausgaben). Of course at that 
time there was a lack of precision about the terminology (some-
times expenditure was replaced by cost) but the text clearly 
implied a cash flow accounting system. This was also Schüler’s 
[1879, p. 65] and Passow’s [1919, p. 237] opinions. However it 
was not a pure cash flow accounting. Indeed, the law foresaw the 
possibility (but not the obligation) to deduct a yearly amount 
from the revenue for “future extraordinary outlays”. This 
amount, in our opinion, was clearly an element of expense and 
not a call on the net income7. The whole system seemed to be 
devoted to regularly distributing the extraordinary outlays over 
the periods; if used, this device led to a substantial modification 
of the traditional cash flow accounting system and constituted 
an important step toward an accrual accounting system. 
The other conclusions concern the goal of the system and 
the concept of profit. It seems that the whole accounting system 
was devoted to three main tasks: the evaluation of the profit-
ability of the companies (that must not surpass the upper limit 
of 10% of the invested capital), the calculation of the mass of 
distributable dividends and the determination of the basis of 
taxation. According to the law (§ 29) the profit (Gewinn) was 
calculated after deduction of the interest (Zins) paid to the 
shareholders as a normal and automatic remuneration of their 
capital, independently from any profit. Keyssner [1875, p. 100] 
has shown that this stipulation was the legalization of a former 
practice: he quotes examples of statutes (accepted before the 
publication of the law) containing this conception of profit such 
as those of the Berlin-Postdamer Eisenbahngesellschaft (1837) 
and of the Dusseldorf-Elberfeldergesellschaft (1837). As the fa-
mous lawyer noted [1875, p. 128] this conception was contradic-
7  Passow [1919, pp. 247-248] underlines that the expression “Reserve fund” 
is an ambiguous if not unfortunate one. Generally, in matter of traditional 
commercial accounting (at the time of Passow), a reserve is an accumulation of 
profits; but Passow acknowledges that, as a matter of fact, the Reserve fund may 
be understood as a renewal fund (Erneuerungsfonds) created by deduction of 
expenses from revenue [1919, p. 249].
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tory to the view of traditional jurists inherited from the Roman 
tradition notably of Anschütz and Von Völderndorff so as of 
Puchelt.  In our view, it was promoted by managers and econo-
mists (Keyssner mentions the influence of the economic science 
[1875, p. 127]) to reassure shareholders that their share capital 
was as safe as that of creditors’ investments. 
In brief, to achieve these objectives, the first Prussian law 
on railway companies eliminated the traditional balance sheet 
of the merchants, adopted the model of cash flow accounting 
as the basis (principle) of determination of profits, but provided 
a modification of this model to resolve the problem of extraor-
dinary expenditures. These elements are already important to 
grasp the nature of the initial railway accounting system. How-
ever they are not totally clear: what specifically was this cash 
flow accounting system? Fortunately, the Prussian administra-
tion provided the answer to the question soon after the publica-
tion of the law.
THE PRUSSIAN INSTRUCTION OF JANUARY 1839
As emphasized by Mieles, [1932, p. 10] the main points of 
the explanations furnished by the Prussian Minister of Finance 
deal with distinctions between different cash out-flows. Before 
presenting the solution of the Minister it must be said, in ac-
cordance with Mieles {1932, p. 48], that, normally speaking, 
in the frame of a pure (true) cameral (cash flow accounting) 
system, all the expenditures (with exception of the repayment 
of share capital8) must be treated as diminutions of the profit 
of the year. But the Ministry, in line with legislation or practices 
already widely adopted abroad, decided that one must distin-
guish two kinds of expenditures. Firstly, expenditures that do 
not influence the annual result (erfolgsunwirksame Ausgaben), 
such as expenditures for the construction and also those for 
modernising the tracks (as far as conceded by the government 
and financed by shares).Secondly, expenditures that influence 
the result of the year, (erfolgswirksame Ausgaben), such as 
expenditures for the acquisition of inventories, (Betriebsinven-
torium), for maintaining the tracks, for transportation and for 
administration.
The reason for this “anomaly” in the frame of a cash flow 
8  As noted by Mieles [1932, p. 48] in cameral accounting cash inflows 
corresponding to the payment by  shareholders of the capital can obviously not 
be considered as a receipt for the sake of determination of the yearly  result; 
similarly, repayment of share capital is not an element of expenditure.
10
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 39 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss1/6
101Richard, Prussian Railway Dynamic Accounting
based system is obvious: it was «impossible» to treat the early 
and costly expenditures for the construction of the tracks as an 
element of the yearly result for it would have caused losses and 
prevented the shareholders from receiving any profit over a long 
period of time (if the distribution of dividends were based on 
the accounting figures). Accordingly, the only possible solution 
to this problem was to agree that expenditure for construction 
was not an element of result: this was the first but decisive in-
fringement to pure cash flow accounting. This is the reason why 
Mieles was right to affirm that it was not strict cameral (cash 
flow) accounting but a «special form» of cameral accounting» 
[1832, p. 49]. 
This important concession was able to satisfy the compa-
nies. As we are going to see later on, some German accounting 
laws gave rise to numerous protests. However, this was appar-
ently not the case with the law of 1838: we have not found any 
trace of protestation against this law in German literature. Even 
before the promulgation of the law, it seems that the choice of 
private companies was in favour of a similar type of account-
ing. Schüler [1879, p. 65] says that in the statutes of the older 
railway companies, the result was obtained only «on the basis of 
the relationship between cash receipts and expenditures». Pas-
sow [1919, p. 247] quotes the case of the Rhine-Company which, 
in 1837, had a statute presenting a clause of a reserve fund. 
Mieles [1932, p. 10] deems that the law of 1838 was a «recogni-
tion» of practices that had existed earlier on. After the promul-
gation of the law, from 1838 to 1843, the companies apparently 
respected the schedule fixed by the comparison of receipts and 
expenditures.
According to Passow [1919, p. 247] most statutes provided 
for a reserve fund but there were differences as to the treatment 
of this fund. The majority of the companies drew funds after 
distribution of a minimal dividend9 but some companies did 
this by registering expenses before profit calculation10. Although 
there was formally a big difference between the two kinds of 
formation of the reserve fund, Passow [1919, p. 249] notes that, 
as a matter of fact, both systems aimed at providing for renewal 
of the fixed assets.
9  It is for example the case of the Bonn-Kölner Eisengesellschaft in 1841 
[Passow, 1919, p. 247).
10  Passow [1919, p. 248-249] and Mieles [1932, p. 10] quote the case of the 
Berlin-Stettiner Gesellschaft (1840); there is also the case of the Köln Minden 
company in 1848 for a part of its fixed assets [Mieles 1932, p. 10].
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THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE LAW OF 1843
AND THE MANOEUVRES OF THE ADMINISTRATION
With the law of “November 9, 1843”on the Joint Stock 
Companies (Über die Actiengesellschaften) the Prussian Gov-
ernment made provision for a specific11 regulation of the Joint 
Stock companies, for the first time.  Paragraph 24 of this law 
stated that the board of directors had to keep such accounting 
books as to give “a view of the patrimonial situation” (Übersicht 
der Vermögenslage) and in the first three months of every com-
mercial year had to draw up a balance of the wealth (Vermögen) 
of the company.  Moreover, the paragraph 17 mentioned the 
principle of the fixity of capital. According to one of the best 
specialists of commercial law of the 19th century a strict lecture 
of this law could have rendered impossible for railway compa-
nies to produce mere “management balances”, which means 
results based on cash flows, and have required taking account 
of the values of assets and liabilities [Von Strombeck, 1882, p. 
467]. However, fortunately for the state administration and the 
managers responsible for railways, this law was very imprecise: 
there was no information concerning the valuation of assets 
and liabilities and no determination whether the balance sheet 
would be the basis for the distribution of dividends .This fact is 
stressed by  Schüler [1879, p. 66]. With such a margin of flex-
ibility it was possible for the administration and the managers 
of railway companies to ignore the law and to go on using the 
principles stipulated in the law of 1838.
As Passow shows [1919, p. 232] the Prussian administration 
went on accepting statutes where profits were only based on the 
comparison of receipts and expenditures: this was notably the 
case of the statutes of Bergish-Markish (1844) and the Berlin-
Hamburger railway Joint Stock companies12. A little later on, 
this resistance of the German railway commercial administra-
tion was fostered by the decisions of the tax administration. On 
the 30 May 1853, a tax law on railways (Eisenbahnsteuergesetz) 
stipulated in its article 2 that “the net profit (Reinertrag) of the 
railway firms is considered as the distributable amount ... after 
deduction of administrative, maintenance and management 
costs, together with the necessary contribution to the reserve 
fund and the amounts for the planned retribution and repay-
11  The ALR law was not a specific law on joint stock companies [Laux, 1998, 
p. 41].
12  In the same vein,  Mieles [1932, p. 34] who confirms that the law of 1843 
has not been applied by the Köln Minden and the Nieder Markisch companies.
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ments of the borrowings...». This definition of profit was totally 
in line with the kind of cash flow accounting advocated by the 
Minister of Commerce. As Schüler [1879, p. 66] emphasized, 
this law also disregarded the patrimonial balance sheet.
After this date the Ministry of Commerce continued its 
“play” with the commercial law of 1843: in 1856 this Ministry 
published a list of recommendations to be followed so that the 
statutes of the railway companies could be admitted [Passov, 
1919, p. 239]. This time the administration acknowledged that 
the net profit (Reingewinn) had to be based on the registration 
of the movements of the balance sheet and not on the calcula-
tion of the difference between the receipts and the expenditures 
[Passow, 1919, p. 239]13. But this conclusion remained purely 
formal. Passow [1919, p. 239] shows, on the basis of some pub-
lished statutes, that the Ministry “went on to accept statutes in 
contradiction” with the law of 1843.
The evolution of the situation was however worth noting 
on one single point: the case of “interests” on shares. Under 
the pressure of the lawyers it was decided that there could no 
longer be any interest distributed to the shareholders after the 
construction of the railway but only dividends. However this 
practice of interest could be admitted during the period of con-
struction on the condition that the company could determine 
the period of construction and the rate of interest (article § 17 
of the law): this concession was obviously obtained for the sat-
isfaction of “hurried shareholders” despite the opposition from 
strict-minded lawyers. Keyssner [1975, p. 209] notes that this 
new regulation constrained the railway companies, notably the 
Cologne-Minden Company, to modify their statutes.
THE LATE EVOLUTION FROM 1843 TO 1861: 
TOWARDS A KIND OF “DYNAMIC” ACCOUNTING
In 1838, as we have seen, the supremacy of the cash flow ac-
counting had been admitted for the calculation of the profit for 
railway companies. The registration of a yearly expense for an-
ticipating extraordinary expenses was only a possibility opened 
to the interested companies.  This situation changed at the end 
of the fifties as in 1857 the Ministry of commerce launched an 
inquiry concerning the question of the “funds” of the railway 
companies14. It was apparently intended to clarify the terminol-
13  This acknowledgment is confirmed by a circular instruction of March 29, 
1859 [Von Strombeck, 1882, p. 481].
14  These developments are mainly based on Passow [1919, pp. 249-253]. For 
13
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ogy, the structure and the goal of these funds and to discuss the 
possibility of a move towards a more systematic use, with the 
directors.
The first result of this enquiry was to distinguish two kinds 
of funds: the reserve funds (Reservefonds) and renewal funds 
(Erneuerungs fonds). The role of the “Reservefonds” was said 
to deal with extraordinary and non customary expenditures 
such as flooding and accidents. The role of renewal funds was 
restricted to cope with the problem of expenditures for renewals 
so as “to permit, as much as possible, the equilibrium (Gleichmäs-
sigkeit) in the “loading” (Belastung) of the proprietors of shares 
at any time” (text quoted by Passow [1919, p. 252], underlined 
by the author). This was clearly an instrument to get regular div-
idends. As Passow says [1919, p. 251] these propositions “seem 
to satisfy the directions of the railway companies”. This could 
explain that only a year after a circular of “January 27,1958” 
was issued by the Ministry of Finance, regretting that a renewal 
fund was not provided for in all statutes and asserting that the 
reserve funds were not sufficient to take account of the regular 
wear and tear of the fixed assets. This administration stressed 
that it was not possible to speak of a distributable profit without 
an allocation to a renewal fund so as to assure the sustainability 
(Nachhaltigkeit) of the dividends. Consequently, it logically de-
manded that the railways directions measured the importance 
of the yearly allocations for the reserve and the renewal funds in 
conformity with the views of the inquiry. It also required prov-
ing the respect of the disposition of this circular to get the agree-
ment of the Ministry for the determination and the payment of 
dividends. Unlike the law of 1843, this text had an immediate 
practical repercussion. According to Passow [1919, p. 252], just 
after the promulgation of the circular, the new statutes15 regu-
larly provided for a renewal fund.
To conclude, apparently, in Prussia, at the end of the fifties, 
the situation for railway companies seemed to be clear: the ini-
tial cash flow accounting has been transformed in a kind of ac-
crual accounting devoted to the “regulation” of dividends, which 
means, according to the Schmalenbach’s famous qualification, a 
kind of “dynamic” accounting [Richard, 1998, p. 576]. But this 
was without taking account of the “misfits” of the commercial law.
the same view and the same conclusions see also Mieles [1932, p. 11].
15  Even some “old railway companies” such as the Rhein Eisenbahngesellschaft 
in 1858, the Bergish in 1859 and the Türingische Eisenbahngesellschaft in 1862 
decided to build a renewal fund [Mieles, 1932, p. 12].
14
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THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF 1861 AND 1870 AND THE 
UNAVOIDABLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL 
AND RAILWAY ACCOUNTING
At the beginning of the sixties, lawyers from different states 
were called up to lay the foundations of the first Commercial 
Code for the whole of Germany. As a result, the law of “June 24, 
1861”16forced all merchants (Kaufleute) to follow the rules of 
the General German Commercial Code. The aim of this Code, in 
line with the French Commercial Code of 1807, was to protect 
the interest of creditors by drawing up a balance sheet which 
enables the comparison of the market value of assets with the 
bulk of debts, in the hope that the difference between these two 
amounts could reach a maximum amount, in order to avoid any 
problem of payment of debt in case of a failure. This type of ac-
counting, which received the name of “static” accounting in con-
tinental Europe, [Moxter, 1984; Richard, 2005 b], was mainly 
expressed in the article 29, 30 and 31 of the Code.
This type of legislation was clearly reinforcing the argumen-
tation of those who, on the basis of the Prussian law of 1843, as-
certained that the railway companies had to make a patrimonial 
balance sheet. However, the defenders of the “special” railway 
balance sheets could have pleaded the fact that railway compa-
nies were not merchant people or companies. But this last hope 
was also lost with the second step of the commercial legisla-
tion: the law of “June11, 1870”. The articles 5 and 208 of this 
law extended the rules concerning merchants and commercial 
companies to every kind of joint stock (public) company, includ-
ing railway companies. As stressed by Schüler [1879, p. 66] the 
presentation of this law (Motiven) clearly expressed that “the 
making of purely operating (Ertrags) balances and the distribu-
tion of purely annual surpluses (blossen Jahresüberschüssen) is 
inadmissible”. Following the article 217 “Only the profit left can 
be distributed among the shareholders, according to the annual 
balance sheet (which means the patrimonial balance sheet), after 
an eventual deduction for creating a reserve fund if it is pro-
vided for by the statute".
Thus, at that time, the situation was clear: the German 
railway companies had the choice of either respecting the law 
or fighting to change it. They chose the second option because 
it was, as we are going to see, "impossible" to accept the tradi-
16  This law was applied in 1862 in Prussia [Mieles, 1932, p. 12].
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tional commercial rules17  18
THE FIGHT OF THE RAILROADS AGAINST THE STATIC 
LAWS OF 1861 AND 1870
This battle lasted about ten years from 1873 to 1883 and 
mobilized practitioners as well as theoreticians along five main 
stages corresponding to various declarations and articles.
The first attack was launched, not surprisingly so, by the 
main contesters, the managers of railway companies. In 1873 a 
special commission was nominated by the Prussian government 
to study the problems connected with the railway concessions 
(Spezial Kommission zur Untersuchung des Eisenbahn-Konzes-
sionwesens). Among the participants was Scheele, the president 
of the Reichseisenbahn, who declared that “a part of the stipula-
tions of the law of 11 June 1870, especially those concerning the 
balance sheet, the calculation of dividends and the bankruptcy 
are not suitable for railway companies”. He added that the value 
of assets” should not be obtained on the basis of their separate 
components, but according to their value in use (Nutzen), it 
means the profitability (Ertrag) derived from their global entity” 
and that this was “important for the payment of dividends, the 
determination of balance sheet and the problems of insolvency”. 
He also stressed, in order to justify these assertions, that, for 
railway companies, “it can be considered that the assumption 
of a going concern (vermuthete Fortbestand des Unternehmens) 
is integrated in the law” and concluded that “the fixed assets... 
must be considered as stable items (stabile Posten) without any 
impact of future reductions of value” (Declarations taken from 
appendix of the report by the special Commission  published in 
stenographic report of the debate of the House of deputes, first 
17  According to Mieles [1932 , pp. 31-32] the study of the practice during the 
period 1861-1884 shows that there is an appearance of the commercial balance 
sheets (under the name of “general balance sheets”) in Prussia : this is notably the 
case of the Rheinishe EBG(in 1862), the Berlin-Potsdam Magdeburg EBG, the 
Berlin-Anhalten EBG, and later the Bergisch-Märkish EBG. However, it seems 
that the railway companies did not totally respect the “play” of the new laws and 
tried to introduce some “fictitious items” within the new balance-sheets that had 
nothing to do with the legal balance-sheet. According to Mieles this rise of the 
problems with commercial balance sheets is the reason which caused Scheffler 
to intervene (see below).
18  It should be noted however that the 1862 law, while reiterating the 
prohibition of interests on shares, went on authorizing the payment of these 
interests during the period of construction: on this point the lawyers had taken 
account of the interests of railway companies.
16
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session of the 12th legislature period 1873-74, third volume, 
pp. 1638 and followings, with some words emphasized by the 
author). To end with the subject of this special commission, it is 
worth while noting that to a question concerning the desirability 
to maintain the existence of interest for shares during the period 
of construction the consulted expert mandated by the railway 
companies replied that the consent of interest was “obvious” 
and that this interest “is part of the fixed assets” [Faucher, 1873, 
p. 41]. The last part of the answer testified that, for this expert, 
(as well as the majority of companies) the accumulation in the 
asset side of interest paid to shareholders during the period of 
construction was not creating a fictitious asset contrary to the 
opinion of many lawyers (see below). All these ideas were appar-
ently largely shared by the directors of railway companies19
The second attack emanated from the judicial side. Two 
years after the commission one of the leading commercial 
lawyers of Germany published a long article and reiterated 
after Scheele that “the distribution of dividends is not to be con-
nected with patrimonial balances but only with the annual 
calculation of operating profits (Jahresbetriebsberechnungen)” 
[Keyssner, 1875, p. 135] . He stressed that anything else is "im-
possible" especially "the determination of the value of the expen-
sive assets taken one by one independently from each other" [p. 
133]. He also added that if a kind of value is to be considered for 
the balance sheet' "it must be a value derived from the profits 
(Ertrag) taking the probable duration of the firm" into account 
[1875, p. 142] and that, as a practical means “the costs form the 
starting point" [1875, p. 133]. In spite of these basic similarities 
it seems that Keyssner provided for two new elements in the 
battle against the old accounting system. First, he emitted the 
idea that the comparison of assets (at value) with debts and the 
maintaining of a minimum of capital were not obligatorily the 
best means to protect the creditors: "the joint stock company 
could have lost the half of its capital and nevertheless offered 
an entire security to the creditors, the enterprise is alive if it 
is capable of getting a revenue" [p. 143]. This was practically a 
19  See also the declarations of Schüler, Director of the “Deutsche 
Eisenbahnbaugesellschaft”, according to whom the appliance of regulations valid 
for merchants could be “stupid for enterprises whose object is not handling” 
[Schüler, 1878, p. 66]. Schüler agreed that the valuation of tangible assets and 
financial participations should basically based on value in use («Macht zu 
Nutzen») but, insofar as these values are very difficult to obtain, it is better to 
content with acquisition costs [ p. 67]. In any case the recourse to market value 
could be “a calamity” [p. 67].
17
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new conception for the time according to which the protection 
of creditors was obtained so long as the current revenues cov-
ered the current expenses. Thanks to that position, it "could be 
possible to distribute dividends to the shareholders even if the 
whole of the capital is not covered by assets" [Keyssner, p. 143]. 
Second, he enlarged the scope of the reforms in proposing this 
scheme for all joint stock companies (and not only railway com-
panies) "the obligatory patrimonial (the one that calculates the 
liquidation value for the owner of the business) balance sheet 
could disappear" and be replaced, for the sake of distribution of 
dividends, by an another type of balance sheet allowing for "an 
equal division of profits" [p. 144].
The third and neuralgic element of the new course was an 
article published in 1878 by another lawyer, J. von Strombeck 
(from Magdeburg) whose ideas also played a significant role 
in the course of the battle. Von Strombeck, as well as all the 
preceding actors, admitted that the problem of distribution of 
dividends for joint stock and especially railway companies was 
a crucial one and that it was very important to find some means 
to cope with the problem of “the necessary weak returns in the 
first year of operation” and to “avoid any influence of fluctuation 
of prices on the stable assets” [1878, I, p. 17]. He also asserted, 
as did Keyssner, that, from the part of creditors, “the agreement 
of credits should not be based on the importance of the capital 
in its relationship to the wealth (patrimonium) but on the profit-
ability of the fixed assets” and that the traditional legal position 
was not a convenient one [1878 I, pp. 3 and 23]. These two first 
elements allowed him to declare, in line with his predecessors, 
that the legal (“static”) balance sheet based on market values 
was not convenient for shareholders (for the distribution of divi-
dends) and even for creditors, especially in the case of railway 
companies [1878 I, p. 3].
The originality of Von Strombeck seems to rely on the fact 
that he proposed a way of reasoning for a systematic construc-
tion of various types of balance sheets.  According to him the 
content and the valuation of the various assets of companies 
depended on the “aim” (Gegenstand or Zweck) of this com-
pany or of this balance sheet20 [1878 I, p. 4 and 1878 I, p. 94-95]. 
Thanks to this basic principle he distinguished three fundamen-
20  On the beginning of the article (p. 4) the Von Strombeck’s classification 
deals with different types of companies; but on pages 2 and 29 he specifies that 
inside a same company various types of assets are to be found which can be 
classified along his principles.
18
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tal categories of fixed assets for joint stock companies [1878, I, 
p. 4]. The first class comprises assets devoted to the “use in a 
permanent propriety” [1878 I, p. 4]. Concerning this kind of as-
sets (companies using this type of assets) the rest of the article 
shows that there is no question of making valuations based on 
the market values: the assets should appear as stable assets (sta-
bile Grundvermögen) with a valuation at cost. For most of these 
kinds of assets their usage creates a depreciation (Entwerthung 
aus Abnützung) which must be, as in the case of railroads, com-
pensated by a restoration (Instandhaltung) owing to a deduc-
tion out of revenue so that the assets remained stable [1878 I, 
pp. 5-6]. The second class comprises assets intended to be sold 
[1878 I, p. 6] and forms the variable fixed assets. These assets, 
as illustrated by numerous examples throughout the article, 
are valued at their exit value (Veraüsserungswerth). The third 
class is specifically devoted to the assets of insurance companies 
[1878 I, p. 7]. According to the latter, this kind of company has 
to treat its assets according to the principles laid for the second 
class [1878 I, p. 33]. According to these rules, the fixed assets of 
railway companies and many joint stock companies could be 
valued at cost, which was satisfactory to avoid price fluctuation 
and their incidence on the distribution of dividends [1878 II, p. 
76].Von Strombeck, differing from other specialists, was aware 
that this type of balance sheet was contradictory to the law and 
proposed to change it not only for railway companies but also 
for all joint stock companies [1878 II, p. 106] He was convinced 
that these questions and especially the question of the basis for 
distribution of dividends were of public interest [1878 II, p. 84] 
at least for railway companies.
The fourth attack against the static law was launched in 
187921 by Hermann Scheffler, a railway director of the Braun-
schweig Company. Scheffler was very conscious that the whole 
affair on the discussion of various balance sheets was funda-
mentally a social conflict opposing the “creditors” who want 
what he called an “objective value” (objektiver Werth”), which 
means market value, and the “proprietors” (in our view the 
shareholders for railway company) who want cost value [1879, 
p. 34]. He recognized that there was a competition of many pos-
sible principles of accounting [1879, p. 20]. He also thought that 
the construction of a balance sheet depended on the aim the 
assets are detained for but he added that this aim was connected 
21  According to Mieles [1932, p. 13] Scheffler had presented his thesis as soon 
as 1875.
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to an analysis of the purposes of the various stakeholders. Accord-
ing to him the value of an asset that only a proprietor is inter-
ested in, (such as a machinery) is the subjective value for this 
proprietor, which practically speaking, means the cost [1879, p. 
23].On the contrary, for objects to be sold, which is of interest to 
other people than proprietors, the value is the “objective value”, 
which basically means the exit (market) value [1879, p. 24]22.
Interestingly, Scheffler was a strict defender of the theory 
of cost value for “objective” elements: he made it clear that 
“no circumstantial event, no variation of price, no variation 
of profitability and other external time related conditions can 
change the cost value of assets for use: only the loss due to use 
must be taken into account and notably with the formation of 
systematic annual depreciation [1879, pp. 26-27]. Even material 
inventories such as rail inventories are not to be impaired [1879, 
p. 40]. More surprisingly, at least for the traditional lawyers but 
also even for the railway managers of the time, Scheffler was 
persuaded that every intangible long term investment must be 
treated as a fixed asset to be depreciated, even foundation costs 
and education costs [1879, p. 39]: he was a defender of what has 
been called afterwards, at the time of Schmalenbach, the pure 
dynamic school!
All these ideas were connected to the problem of profit regu-
lation; Scheffler notably said that the cameral (cash) accounting 
is “not rational because it can cause a considerable fluctuation 
of profit” [1879, p. 14]. If he did not explicitly mention the 
case of the static patrimonial accounting it is obvious that all 
his work was intended to abolish this type of accounting. It is 
worthwhile noting that, according to Scheffler, the demolition 
of this type of accounting was not necessarily connected to the 
replacement of the law: he thought that the articles 29 and 31 of 
the 1870 law were sufficiently vague about the concept of value 
(Werth) so as to admit the cost as a basis of accounting founda-
tion for joint stock companies [1879, p. 20]. In this case a simple 
evolution of the case law would have been sufficient.
The last part of the story once again concerns von Strom-
beck whose second article devoted to the question of the mak-
ing of balance sheet for joint stock companies in 1882. Von 
Strombeck, like Scheffler, recognized that the problem with 
the static balances was not one of practical valuation difficulty: 
22  Scheffler (p.24) however distinguishes two kinds of objective value: the first 
one for long term resale (based on actuarial calculation) and the second one for 
short term resale (based on market value).
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it is always possible if one has decided to apply this theory to 
find market values, even if necessary, to liquidate value (Ab-
bruchwerth) [1882, p. 491]. No, the problem was a conflict of 
interests between shareholders and creditors implying two kinds 
of ways to determine a profit [1882, pp. 460, 494 and 495]. Von 
Strombeck was aware that abandoning the patrimonial balance 
sheet and its objective value could be dangerous because the 
new theory  of creditor protection by  the sole observation of the 
operating cash flows may, in case of crisis, have as consequence, 
the disappearance of the companies [1882, pp. 494-495]23. But 
a special balance sheet was “required” for dividends [1882, p. 
461]. This “dira necessita” (strong necessity) “must lead to the 
system of stable accounts” [1882, p.  495]. Differing from Schef-
fler, he maintained that the 1870 law was clearly in favour of 
market values and not liable to an interpretation in favour of 
cost, he underlined that there was no  other way to change  the 
law: it was even “a matter of public interest” [1882, p. 483)].
THE VICTORY OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MANAGERS
AND THE NEW 1884 LAW
This victory was obtained in two steps, the second one be-
ing the definitive one. The first break against the 1870’s legisla-
tion was obtained in 1879 with a case from the ROHG (High 
Imperial Tribunal) handling the valuation of fixed assets of 
railway companies. It was declared, in line with the Scheffer’s 
thesis, that the valuation at acquisition cost was not strictly 
contradictory to the law (ROHG, 1879, Bd 25, p. 307). Even if 
important, this decision was restricted to the case of railway 
companies and subjected to criticism according to some lead-
ing lawyers who deemed it was a denial of the spirit of the law. 
Obviously this case was not sufficient to solve the problem. The 
definitive solution to the problem was given by a change of the 
law. A new law, the 1884 law (Aktienrechtsnovelle vom “July 18, 
1884”, RGBI, p. 123), was specifically dedicated to joint stock 
companies, and added new articles to the corpus for joint stock 
companies, notably the articles 185 a and 185 b which are very 
important for the question treated and which deserve to be 
quoted fully.
The article 185a requires that for the construction of the 
balance sheet, the four following rules (referring to article 31) 
23  In a very modern way he “answered” to this anxiety by asserting that 
creditors must make a personal  valuation of the risks they take before lending to 
a business [1879, p. 35]. Scheffler presumably influenced Von Strombeck.
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must be applied:
1. Shares, obligations and merchandises which have a 
stock market or market price may be valued up to 
this price... but if this price is above the acquisition 
or the production cost this cost is the maximum 
limit not to be exceeded.
2. The other assets (elements) composing the wealth 
(“andere Vermögens Gegenstände”) are to be valued 
to the limit of the acquisition or production cost.
3. Fixed assets and other items which are not devoted 
to reselling but to durable use... may be valued, with 
no consideration to an inferior value (geringeren 
Wert), at the acquisition or production cost, under 
the condition that a systematic deduction for their  
use (Abnützung) or a corresponding allocation to a 
renewal  fund (Erneuerungs fonds) will be made.
4. The cost of organisation and administration may not 
be registered as assets and must appear for their full 
amount as expenditure (Ausgabe) in the calculation 
of the annual profit.
According to the official justification of the law itself [Mo-
tiven zu Novelle 1884] this new legislation was composed of two 
very distinct elements. The first element was the recognition of 
the principle of prudence: from 1884 onwards, for joint stock 
companies, it was no longer possible to recognize non-realised 
profits. This was in line with the evolution of patrimonial (static) 
accounting in continental Europe and justified, as was the case 
in France about twenty years ago, by scandals related to the 
distribution of dividends on the basis of potential profits. If the 
new law had been limited to the recognition of this principle, it 
could not be said that the shareholders had succeeded in intro-
ducing a new philosophy of accounting in their favour.  This can 
be explained by the obligation to take account of potential losses 
on behalf of diminution of values which would have remained 
and caused problems.
The very original element of this law was represented by the 
§ 3 of article 185 a that gave the possibility to joint stock com-
panies to avoid the impairment of fixed assets (at their lower 
market values) and to use a cost valuation assorted with a sys-
tematic depreciation. The explanations (“Motiven”) of the law 
are very clear that this new device for fixed assets was dictated 
22
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by a question of dividends: “if the company had been obliged to 
take account of market values even for this kind of assets, whose 
selling price are subject to considerable fluctuation of prices due 
to the relationship of supply and demand, without their value in 
use (Nutzungswert) could be changed, it would have resulted a 
full untrue distribution of profits” [Motiven, p. 301]. The “Mo-
tiven” were also very clear that this part of the legislation was 
an exception to the general “static” rules which remained in 
place: “the project of law, in relationship with the paragraph 31 
of the Commercial Code, takes as a basic principle, that all pat-
rimonial assets are to be valued at their value (it means market 
value) but no higher than their acquisition or production cost" 
[Motiven, p. 303]. But this exception was the only exception: the 
generalisation of a system of distribution of costs as proposed 
by Sheffler for intangible long term expenses was not accepted 
as it was notably clearly expressed for organisation and admin-
istration costs (see supra article 185a-4).
THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE INFERRED BY THE 
PRUSSIAN RAILROAD ACCOUNTING
       In our opinion the events described above clearly show 
that the “time of railways” was the beginning of the death for 
cash flows (“cameral”) and patrimonial (static) accounting 
styles, at least in Germany. We have seen that under the influ-
ence of public accountants, at the very beginning of this period, 
the thirties, a kind of cameral accounting had generally been 
applied to railway companies. It is important to stress that this 
cameral accounting was not a pure one for it was decided to 
treat the initial expenditures (for constructions and purchase 
of rolling stock) not as elements of results (as should normally 
have been the case) but as an investment: it was, to use Mieles’s 
expression, a “modified” cameral accounting. This already mon-
grel accounting was again changed in the fifties with the more 
and more massive introduction of a kind of depreciation ac-
counting instead of the registration of expenditures at the time 
of renewals. Towards the end of the period studied it can be said 
that, as far as private24 railway companies are considered, the 
cameral accounting was over or very nearly so: this was the first 
victim of the railway accounting battle.
In the seventies, railway directors and some lawyers con-
nected to them, led another successful fight against the applica-
24  This assertion is untrue for state-owned railway companies up to 1927.
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tion of static (market oriented) accounting, which was at the 
time, the dominant kind of accounting. In 1884, as a result of 
this last fight, static accounting was no longer obligatorily ap-
plied for fixed tangible assets for all joint stock companies. It 
was also the beginning of a (long) agony for static accounting 
and the first clear introduction of very important elements of 
historical cost accounting. Concerning this last point (the break-
through of a kind of dynamic accounting in 1884) there is not 
much debate among historians. For example, Walb [1933, p.5] 
deems that there is a kind of return to the solutions of the ALR, 
after 90 years. These solutions were largely marked by a refusal 
of market value [Richard, 2005c], and Barth [1953, p. 117] and 
constitute a “decisive breach” (entscheidende Bresche) in the 
common market value (gemeinenWert) for balance sheet valu-
ation. However, Schneider, [1995, p.151], while commenting on 
the 1884’s law, is more struck by the appearance of the principle 
of prudence (lower of cost or market rule) than the development 
of any kind of dynamic accounting.
THE REASON FOR THE CHANGE
There is considerable debate concerning the reason for 
change, in comparison to the points previously developed. First 
we are going to highlight what appears to be the opinion of Ger-
man historians before giving our own interpretation. 
Barth insists upon a technical point of view: the patrimo-
nial (static) theory would have failed and needed to be replaced 
because in “many cases, especially for fixed assets it is almost 
impossible to find a reliable market value” [1950, p. 53 and 
also similarly 1953, pp. 116 and 147]. He also adds a second 
argument: even if these technical difficulties could be solved, it 
would result in «a totally arbitrary income which has nothing 
to do with the real profits (Erträge) of the enterprise” [1953, 
p. 116] because rising prices could eventually trigger the dis-
tribution of unrealised profits [1950, p. 52]. It seems to us that 
this second motive is not important for our case for the static 
lawyers, beginning with first the French and 25 then the Ger-
man lawyers, had been able to respond to this type of criticism 
(thanks to the lower of cost of market rule) with no change to 
their basic philosophy of accounting style for the protection 
of creditors. So, to conclude, the technical problem remains 
Barth’s main argument.
25  According to Dupin notably as quoted by Barth himself [1950, p. 52]
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The Schneider’s thesis is another one which means com-
petence problem. Schneider [1995, pp. 132-133] stresses that 
throughout the twentieth century “the discussion of financial 
accounting was dominated by lawyers” who were unaware of 
merchant book keeping and that, as an exception, was unfamil-
iar with double book keeping which led a commercial lawyer 
(meaning Keyssner who led this fight against static accounting) 
to calculate distributable profit separately from the balance 
sheet".
In our opinion all these arguments cannot explain the 
real reasons of the change. As far as the technical argument is 
concerned, it is interesting to note that von Strombeck himself, 
a strong partisan of the "system of stable accounts", however, 
acknowledged that "the reason for its adoption was not so much 
the difficulty to find a true valuation of fixed assets as rather the 
possibility to use, in particular for the distribution of dividends, 
a mass of results only depending on the utilities produced by 
stable wealth (patrimonium)” [1882, p. 464]. He added that "in 
the case of a patrimonial balance sheet,  the biggest difficulty 
and the uncertainty to find an objective value must not deter 
from proceeding with a valuation and that, in case of doubt... at 
worst, one can use the liquidation value" [1882, p. 491]. 
As for the argument of competence, one can wonder why 
lawyers such as Keyssner and Strombeck could inevitably 
discover the virtue of merchants' bookkeeping while their col-
leagues, authors of the 1870's legislation, were unable to take 
this step. Our explanation is that, beyond a question of compe-
tence, there was a question of social environment: these men 
"discovered stable accounts" (to use the von Strombeck's expres-
sion) because they were the spokespeople for railway managers 
and shareholders and expressed their needs. 
But what were these needs? What was the reason for this 
"impossibility" to use the patrimonial type of accounting as 
evoked by Keyssner [1875, p. 133]? What was this "dura neces-
sita" mentioned by von Strombeck [1882, p. 482] forcing to 
adopt the system of stable accounts? Our answer is that "stable 
accounts" (a marvellously eloquent expression) were necessary 
to give stable dividends to shareholders, a sine qua condition 
to collect funds and to develop railway companies and big joint 
stock companies. The importance of the stable dividends ques-
tion is not only acknowledged by German historians of railway 
economics. At that time this question also constitutes the very 
framework of reasoning for all the defenders of dynamic ac-
counting versus static accounting. Whether it is the case of 
25
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Keyssner [1875, p. 144], of von Strombeck [1878 II, p.76] or of 
Scheffler [1879, p. 14] their common fear was price fluctuation 
and its influence on dividend distribution. Even the documents 
explaining the motives for the 1884 law, have, as we have seen, 
evoked the problem of dividend stability. Our conclusion is that 
the birth of a specific type of accounting for railway companies 
and the promulgation of a specific law for joint stock companies 
was due to the need for greater dividend stability. This could not 
have been reached with the previous types of accounting.
This stability was not only required for the sake of one par-
ticular shareholder. It was also required for distributing invest-
ment products equally among the different shareholders who 
had been participating in this investment all through the period. 
To summarize, the birth of historical cost dynamic accounting 
in German legislation was a product of shareholders craving for 
stable and equally distributed dividends over time.
THE EXISTENCE OF A THEORY
The previous developments have shown that during the 
period 1870-1884 all the main actors of the struggle against the 
patrimonial accounting defended a kind of historical cost (dy-
namic) accounting. One interesting question is to know if they 
have succeeded in the creation of a (new) theory of accounting. 
This question had already been raised by German authors no-
tably by Walb, Barth and Schneider who disagree over this. We 
are relating their position before expressing our own opinion.
As early as 1983, Walb, in his history of the balance sheet 
dogma, deems that Scheffler “has made an important step in 
matter of accounting theory” [1933, p. 11]. He thinks that Schef-
fler had “conscious dynamic objectives” [1933, p. 15] and had 
finally “opened the road for the whole of the future evolution” 
[1933, p. 17]. Also Mieles [1932, p. 13] insists upon the influence 
of Scheffler on the thoughts of the great theorist, Simon. On the 
contrary,  according to Barth, it was only after the publication of 
the 1884 law on joint stock companies that the theory of balance 
sheet tried to find a justification for the use of cost  valuation in 
matter of balance sheet dressing” [1953 I, p.  117]. Barth thinks 
that the movement of ideas towards the historical cost account-
ing system before 1884 was not  conscious, only inspired by 
practical point of views [1953 I, pp. 156-157].
If we concentrate our study on Scheffler, who benefited 
from the whole intellectual contribution of  Keyssner and von 
Strombeck, we may observe that, in order to justify  his position 
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in favour of an historical cost accounting, Scheffler uses the 
concept of goal (Zweck) to distinguish different types of assets 
(assets for permanent  use, assets for sale). He also deducts a 
type of valuation from this classification (valuation at cost for 
assets for use, valuation at market price for assets for sale) and 
infers from the two previous points an adequate treatment for 
the main types of assets. Is there any big difference, for these 
main elements with the ideas expressed after the First World 
War by theoreticians of the dynamic balance sheet such as 
Rieger and Schmalenbach? Not in our opinion. It would seem 
that Scheffler was an even more consequent theoretician than 
Schmalenbach in so much as he deducted the treatment as as-
sets of intangibles expenditures such as organisational costs 
from his theory. As a matter of fact Scheffler, as well as von 
Strombeck, were, contrary to Barth’s view, perfectly aware of 
the fact that they lived a battle of ideas about conflicting modes 
of calculation of profits (see notably von Strombeck [1882, p. 
460]). They were even conscious that they defended the interests 
of shareholders against those of creditors. Their articles not only 
suggest a list of practical wishes: they also constructed along a 
hypothetical-deductive reasoning, and offered the framework of 
a social theory for historical cost accounting.
For the first time in Germany, if not in the world, the frame-
work of a social theory for historical cost accounting was clearly 
expressed.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PRUSSIAN RAILWAY 
ACCOUNTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL 
LEGAL ACCOUNTING
A classical, if not dominating thesis, is that railroad ac-
counting has played a major role in the development of ac-
counting concepts, especially concerning depreciation, and 
more generally in the development of modern accounting 
theory. The traditional references are those of Holmes [1975] 
and Boockholdt [1977]. But a German author had expressed the 
same thesis as early as 1933: “the theory of balance sheet was 
driven to more clarity by the enterprises with large fixed assets 
especially railways. This evolution made of the profit and loss 
statement the main statement” [Walb, 1933, p. 7 and 17]. As 
Walb’s assertions were never translated into English, his views 
were condemned to oblivion.  According to Holmes [1975, p. 
18] “depreciation was a knotty problem for these early railroad 
accountants. They argued over it... but in the end it was from 
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the very ashes of their disagreements that a modern concept of 
depreciation arose, Phoenix like, fifty years later”. Boockholdt 
while sustaining the same idea [1977, p. 14] enlarged it: “many 
of the basic concepts of accounting theory such as disclosure, 
matching measurement of cash flow, had origins in railroad ac-
counting” [1977, p. 9]. However this thesis has been contested 
by Lemarchand after his study of the historical development 
of railroad accounting in France. According to Lemarchand, in 
a general way, if it is likely that, in matter of management, the 
railway companies have had an influence on the working of en-
terprises belonging to other sectors; it does not seem so obvious 
that their accounting behaviour could truly have had an influ-
ence likewise. [Lemarchand, 1993, p. 525]. 
If we take the example of systematic depreciation (with 
distribution of cost over the period of use of the fixed assets) 
it could hardly be maintained that this concept has been cre-
ated by railway accountants both in France and in Germany. In 
France Lemarchand has shown that, as far as practice is con-
cerned, some examples of such a systematic depreciation  can 
already be found in the 18th century (especially in the second 
part) : depreciation of  horses at the “Forge d’Oberbruck et Man-
ufacture de fer blanc de Wegsheid” in 1739 [Lemarchand, 1993, 
p. 97], depreciation of furniture (by 5%) by the “Company Rey 
and Magneval” in 1751 [Lemarchand, 1993, p. 69], depreciation 
of tools, buildings and horses by the “Manufacture de toiles 
peintes de  Rey” between 1763  and 1792 [Lemarchand  1993, 
pp. 73, 74,98], depreciation of tools by 5%) by the “Manufacture 
de quincaillerie de la Charité sur Loire” in 1767 [Lemarchand 
1993, p. 227], depreciation of machinery (by 4%) by the “Manu-
facture du Logelbach” in 1775 [Lemarchand, 1993, p. 227], 
depreciation of furniture and tools (by 1/24%) by the “Manufac-
ture royale de velours de coton de Sens” in 1778 [Lemarchand, 
1993, p. 1].
The original German feature in this respect can be found as 
early as 1794: it is also possible to find a legislation (Allgemeine 
Preussische Landrecht - ALR - second part § 545) in Prussia con-
cerning the calculation of profit of commercial companies with 
a clause enouncing that (in case of no special stipulation by stat-
ute) the corporate fixed assets are to be systematically depreci-
ated [Barth 1953; Lion 1928; Schneider 1987; p. 443; Schneider 
1995, p. 129]26. Of course this kind of (optimally) dynamic ori-
26  See also Richard [2005 c] for a comparison of German and French situations 
in the context of evolution of the fair value concept.
28
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 39 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss1/6
119Richard, Prussian Railway Dynamic Accounting
ented legislation was soon rebutted by the static ideas of the Na-
poleonic Code of Commerce [Richard 2005 b and c], which was 
translated into German in 1808 by Daniels [Bösselmann, 1939, 
annexe 4]. The French code was notably applied in the Rhine 
provinces even after the collapse of Napoleon27 [Steitz, 1974, p. 
26] and inspired the endeavours of a commercial codification of 
States such as Württemberg in the thirties [Barth, 1953, p. 67]. 
This may explain why, in Prussia, the law on joint stock compa-
nies published in 1843 no longer mentioned the possibility of a 
systematic depreciation of fixed assets and presumably diverted 
to a static viewpoint. Nevertheless it seems almost unbelievable 
that, at the beginning of the 19th century, the Prussian merchant 
and lawyer elite was unaware of the ALR and of its mention of a 
dynamic style of depreciation. Furthermore, as Schneider dem-
onstrates [1987, p. 451], it was “not usual to see systematic de-
preciation based on percentage of fixed assets before the second 
part of the 18th century”. A number of books can also be found 
(rarely during the 18th century but more frequently at the begin-
ning of the 19th century) that describe the principle of such a 
depreciation, the first author being Magelsen [1772, p.76]. The 
conclusion is that railway accountants and managers have, in 
no way, contributed to the creation of the concept of dynamic 
depreciation. But, on the contrary, they have played a very big 
role in the dissemination, the theoretical justification and the le-
galization of this concept. They contributed to the dissemination 
because the majority of railway companies, that represented the 
biggest companies at that time, applied this type of depreciation 
at the beginning of the sixties. They play an important role for 
the theoretical justification thanks to the publications of railway 
managers or lawyers closely related to them. They succeeded 
in legalizing through the articles of the 1884 law as a result of 
the pressure of railway lobbyists. To summarize, there has been 
dynamic depreciation and more largely dynamic theory, a domi-
nant approach of accounting. 
THE VALIDITY OF THE “MARKET FOR EXCUSES” 
HYPOTHESIS
In their article about the demand and supply of accounting 
theories Watts and Zimmermann [1979] outline their hypoth-
27  The result of this situation was that until 1861 Prussia had two law 
territories: the West part under French law commercial legislation and the East 
part under ALR, which was not a specific commercial legislation [Steitz 1974, p. 
26].
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esis of a market for excuses according to which, in a regulated 
economy, they “expect to observe changes in accounting theory 
when a new law is passed which impinges on accounting prac-
tice” so that “accounting theory has changed after the introduc-
tion of government regulation” [1979, p. 289 emphasis added]. It 
is clear that they base their reasoning on the case of  US railroad 
legislation : it is their hypothesis that regulation of profits (pri-
marily of the railroads) “created a demand for theories rational-
izing depreciation as an expense” and that “without regulation 
there was no necessity for depreciation to be a charge systemati-
cally deducted each year in determining net income. However, 
because rate regulation was justified in terms of restricting the 
economic profits of monopolists (or eliminating ruinous compe-
tition) regulation created a demand for justifications arguing for 
depreciation to be treated as an annual charge to profits” [1979, 
p. 293]. They concluded that accounting theories are gener-
ally “normative” because “they are used as excuses for political 
action (i.e. the political process creates a demand for theories 
which prescribe rather than describe the world).” [1979, p. 273].
In the case of the German legislation for railway companies 
we do not find any evidence of a market for excuses hypothesis 
.In contrast to Watts and Zimmermann’s hypothesis it seems 
that the change in accounting theory appeared before rather 
than after the law which this theory intended to defend and 
that this theory was describing an already existing practice. The 
sequence of the German case is the following: at the beginning 
Prussian railway companies produced a special type of balance 
sheet and had a concept of profit oriented to their needs. This 
practice had been largely incorporated within the law of 1838, 
the fundamental law concerning rail companies. This was im-
proved through various administrative regulations from 1838 
to 1862, aiming notably at a systematic form of depreciation. 
Throughout this period, to the best of our knowledge, there 
has been no article or book presenting a theory in defence of 
this legislation or control. The reason for this absence of theory 
seems obvious: the legislation was basically in line with the 
practices or the desired practices of the managers and share-
holders of railway companies. Thus there was no reason to jus-
tify anything.
The scene completely changed in 1862 and 1870 when a 
new law developed by lawyers working for the interests of credi-
tors (rather than shareholders) obliged the rail companies to 
produce balance-sheets in total contradiction with their vital in-
terests. As a reaction against these laws and in order to get a new 
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law more favourable to their interests, the railways managers 
and a few astute lawyers sharing the interests of shareholders 
against creditors wrote a significant list of articles in the seven-
ties which, in our view, should be considered as founding a new 
theory of what we call “dynamic accounting” or “historical cost 
accounting”. This theoretical weapon in favour of a new law 
succeeded in 1884 with a law which offered  all joint stock com-
panies (and not only railway companies) the possibility of  using 
the dynamic theory for tangible fixed assets for the first time in 
Germany.
As a conclusion, the German case shows that the theory 
came before the introduction of a new law and was used to pre-
pare it. Furthermore, this theory largely describes a practice in 
line with shareholders’ interests and was frankly advocating the 
basic interests of these shareholders. There was no attempt to 
disguise the needs of short term and regular dividends for hurry 
and worry shareholders under the umbrella of “excuses”. Based 
on this case, our hypothesis is that accounting theories may be 
considered as a weapon to demolish existing practices or regula-
tions rather than an excuse or justification for existing legisla-
tion or practice.
THE VALIDITY OF THE AGENCY THEORY
Agency theory, as represented by the fundamental article 
by Jensen and Meckling on the theory of the firm [1976], ex-
presses three main ideas. Firstly, in the firm, the basic conflict 
opposes on the one hand the managers and on the other hand 
the “outside” equity owners and the creditors. The possibility 
of a conflict between the outside equity owners and the credi-
tors is only marginally indicated in two backside notes [1976, 
pp. 337 and 339]. In fact the opposite applies, bondholders and 
outside equity owners are treated together as potential victims 
of the managers (1976, p. 338). Secondly, the basic conflict can 
be solved by the signature of contracts concerning the monitor-
ing activities, the bonding activities and the emission of shares: 
these contracts can be fair because creditors and outside share-
holders have the possibility of knowing the manoeuvres of man-
agers in advance. Even the suppression of unlimited liability is 
accepted by the creditors by means of a fair contract [1975, p. 
331]. Thirdly, as implied by these two former points, account-
ing can be considered as an information device solicited in the 
course of the issuance of fair contracts between managers and 
outside claimants.
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The history of the Prussian railway accounting illustrates 
that these ideas do not correspond to reality28. The main con-
flict in Germany opposed the creditors on the one hand and the 
outside shareholders and the managers on the other hand. One 
could speak of a “theory” of alliance between managers and 
shareholders and not of a “theory” of agency. The losers of the 
battle, the creditors, were not in a position to sign any compen-
satory contract. They had to accept the (partial) disappearance 
of static accounting because they were weak and they did not 
have the power to resist the alliance of shareholders and manag-
ers.
Accounting, in the course of this battle, was not considered 
as a source of information on managers’ actions but as a means 
of improving their situation as well as the shareholders’ situa-
tion in the matter of distribution of dividends. The new dynamic 
theory was not devoted to calculating the performance but to 
regulating the distributable profit. In short, the issue was not a 
question of “fair” contracts or “fair” information but of the ex-
ercise of harsh power for the sake of the development of a new 
kind of capitalism.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE ROLE OF THE PRUSSIAN 
RAILWAY ACCOUNTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CAPITALIST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
On the  basis of the French  experience, it has been sug-
gested that after the beginning of the industrial revolution (at 
the end of 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries) the 
capitalist models of regulated financial accounting went through 
three main stages of development : static, dynamic and actuarial 
ones [Richard, 2005 b and c]. The history of accounting of pri-
vate rail companies in Germany shows that in this country the 
rail companies played a major role in the spread of historical 
cost accounting principles. In addition, these companies and 
big other joint stock ones, largely contributed to the birth of the 
“dynamic” second stage, at least in continental Europe. If the 
representatives of these rail companies had not invented new 
concepts of accounting, in particular concerning depreciation, 
they did, as early as 1875-1879; elaborate a new theory of ac-
counting (the dynamic theory). This new theory had a profound 
impact, at least on German theorists such as Simon, Rieger and 
28  For another example of this disconnection between agency theory and the 
historical reality see Ding and alii [2008].
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Schmalenbach of the late 19th century and the first part of the 
20th century. It was needed to justify the publication of a new 
law favourable to the interests of impatient shareholders rather 
than those of creditors and to defeat the ideology of public fi-
nance and patrimonial (static) theories. As this theory appeared 
before (rather than after) the law which promulgated the new 
approach and was clearly advocating the defence of the private 
interest of shareholders (not those of the public in the strict 
sense), it would seem possible to assert that the Watts and Zim-
mermann’s basic hypothesis of the “theory of market excuses” 
does not fit with these historical developments.
According to these developments, the main reasons for de-
veloping the new accounting theory were connected with prob-
lems of dividends. Firstly it was imposed by the necessity to find 
accounting procedures which would allow the distribution of 
dividends from the very beginning of the investment cycle even 
in the absence of revenue. Secondly it was fostered by the desire 
to find an accounting model which would enable the distribu-
tion of profits generated by an investment evenly throughout the 
investment cycle and amongst the different shareholders taking 
part in the financing of this investment.
Hence, the second stage of development of capitalist ac-
counting may have been caused by the question of distribution 
of profits and dividends and not of information. However, as 
this attempt took place within the framework of the principle of 
prudence, it was impossible, at that stage of accounting capital-
ism, to achieve a perfect device for the regulation (smoothing) 
and the rise of the rate of accounting profit: the beginning of 
the solution was only to be found at the end of the 20th century 
with the third actuarial stage and the “discovery” of fair value 
accounting [Richard, 2004, 2005 b and 2005d].
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